In a summary of 20 years of research on moral development bredemeier and shields found that

freeborn women in ancient rome were citizens (cives), but could not vote or hold political office. because of their limited public role, women are named less frequently than men by roman historians. but while roman women held no direct political power, those from wealthy or powerful families could and did exert influence through private negotiations. exceptional women who left an undeniable mark on history range from lucretia and claudia quinta, whose stories took on mythic significance; fierce republican-era women such as cornelia, mother of the gracchi, and fulvia, who commanded an army and issued coins bearing her image; women of the julio-claudian dynasty, most prominently livia (58 bc-ad 29), who contributed to the formation of imperial mores; and the empress helena (c.250–330 ad), a driving force in promoting christianity.

women in the ancient greek world had few rights in comparison to male citizens. unable to vote, own land, or inherit, a woman’s place was in the home and her purpose in life was the rearing of children. this, though, is a general description, and when considering the role of women in ancient greece one should remember that information regarding specific city-states is often lacking, is almost always from male authors, and only in athens can their status and role be described in any great detail. neither are we sure of the practical and everyday application of the rules and laws that have survived from antiquity. we do know that spartan women were treated somewhat differently than in other states. for example, they had to do physical training like men, were permitted to own land, and could drink wine.

the answer is the petition of right.

explanation:

offer to of right, real demand of attesting a benefit against the english crown, the most remarkable point of reference being the petition of right of 1628, which parliament sent to charles i fussing of a movement of oversteps of law. the term also implied the framework (invalidated in 1947) by which a subject could sue the crown.   taking a gander at the frameworks used by maria amidu to make a standard in 2015 commending the 1628 petition of right, which was sent to charles i by the english parliament. at uniquely based law the crown, or the sovereign in his official cutoff, couldn't be sued in the ruler's courts. since the ruler was, really, the superior ace of those courts, coordinating value in them between his subjects, he was not subject to their ward. therefore it transformed into a preparation, at whatever point a subject's certified or individual property had come into the responsibility for ruler or his specialists without legitimate perfect, for the subject to engage the master in chamber for its recovery.