How might the use of the cost method of accounting for significant influence investments have resulted in unintended wealth transfers from owners to managers

The market demand curve for a popular teen magazine is given by q = 80 - 10p where p is the magazine price in dollars per issue and q is the weekly magazine circulation in units of 10,000. if the circulation is 400,000 per week at the current price, what is the consumer surplus for a teen reader with maximum willingness to pay of $3 per issue?

Rediger inc., a manufacturing corporation, has provided the following data for the month of june. the balance in the work in process inventory account was $28,000 at the beginning of the month and $20,000 at the end of the month. during the month, the corporation incurred direct materials cost of $56,200 and direct labor cost of $29,800. the actual manufacturing overhead cost incurred was $53,600. the manufacturing overhead cost applied to work in process was $52,200. the cost of goods manufactured for june was:

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?