Why is there a minus sign in the definition of ph?

Aeuropean aircraft producer has spent 15 years in developing a new aircraft that would potential threaten long-lasting boeing's dominance (monopoly) in the same class of aircrafts. the new european aircraft gets high marks on all performance measures except noise. because of the noise, the european producers management is concerned that the us government may impose restrictions which would forbid their aircraft to land in some of the american airports. without restrictions the estimated (present discounted) profit would be 125 million usd. with the restrictions the profit would only be 25 million usd. the chances of both outcomes are estimated to be 50-50. management must decide now whether to the cost of redesign program problem and a 60% chance it will fail. should the european aircraft producer start the noise redesign program if they do not have any redesign parts of the aircraft to solve the noise problem. is 25 million usd. there is a 40% chance that redesign will solve the noise additional information than mentioned above? draw the decision tree, indicate probabilities and outcomes of the events * imagine that the company could find out in advance the outcome of the u. s. government's e find the expected value of perfect information about the u. s. government's decision. decision. draw a new decision tree, indicate probabilities and outcomes of the events.

Bagwell's net income for the year ended december 31, year 2 was $189,000. information from bagwell's comparative balance sheets is given below. compute the cash received from the sale of its common stock during year 2. at december 31 year 2 year 1 common stock, $5 par value $ 504,000 $ 453,600 paid-in capital in excess of par 952,000 856,600 retained earnings 692,000 585,600

Why is the cournot equilibrium an​ equilibrium? a. there are​ short-run barriers to exit in a cournot​ duopoly, so both firms cannot alter their output levels. b. given the other​ firm's level of​ production, both firms are maximizing profits and cannot improve their situation by unilaterally altering their level of output. c. both firms operate at zero profit under a cournot​ equilibrium, so they would face negative profits if they change output. d. both firms operate at minimum​ long-run average cost under a cournot​ equilibrium, so changes to output would reduce​ long-run profits. even if they​ can't collude, why​ don't firms set their outputs at the joint​ profit-maximizing levels​ (i. e., the levels they would have chosen had they​ colluded)? a. given that other firm produces at the collusive​ level, a firm could increase their own profits by increasing output above the collusive level. b. the midpoint of the collusion curve​ (i. e., the collusive​ outcome) lies below the reaction​ curves, so both firms have an incentive to increase output under the cournot duopoly. c. both a and b are correct d. both a and b are incorrect