Square Footage, x Asking Price ($000s), y 1148 154 1096 159.9 1142 169 1288 169.9 1322 170 1466 179.9 1344 180 1544 189 1494 189.9 What is the coefficient of determination for the data above

The assumptions of the production order quantity model are met in a situation where annual demand is 3650 units, setup cost is $50, holding cost is $12 per unit per year, the daily demand rate is 10 and the daily production rate is 100. the production order quantity for this problem is approximately:

After the embarrassing sign incident at the restaurant you own, you decide to offer employees a six-week fundamental writing skills workshop. a local business communication instructor, who has experience teaching writing skills at treleaven community college, will facilitate the sessions. to encourage employees to attend these optional sessions, write an email that explains why you’re offering the workshop and why employees should participate.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?