Business
Business, 30.10.2021 14:00, yedida

Misha is attending a meeting with several colleagues. During a discussion of suggestions to improve training approaches in the organization, Misha raised her hand to provide a suggestion and to ask a follow up question. Raising of the hand is a common type of what nonverbal communication act

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Using a cps-sample of 7,440 individuals, you estimate the following regression: = 20.91 - 2.61 x female where female is a binary variable that takes on the value of 1 for females and is 0 otherwise. the standard error on the coefficient on female is 0.25. the 95% confidence interval for the gender wage gap, or the amount that females earn less, is: a) [-3.10, -2.12] b) [18.30, 23.52] c) [-3.02, -2.20] d) [-1.96, -1.64]
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Business, 23.06.2019 00:00, silonis21
1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?
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Misha is attending a meeting with several colleagues. During a discussion of suggestions to improve...

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