A is formed when a firm entering a market pools its resources with those of a local firm.

Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1

The winston company estimates that the factory overhead for the following year will be $1,250,000. the company has decided that the basis for applying factory overhead should be machine hours, which is estimated to be 50,000 hours. the total machine hours for the year were 54,300. the actual factory overhead for the year were $1,375,000. determine the over- or underapplied amount for the year.

On analyzing her company’s goods transport route, simone found that they could reduce transport costs by a quarter if they merged different transport routes. what role (job) does simone play at her company? simone is at her company.