The turbulent period of the 1970s in the U. S. demonstrated a need for companies to adopt anticipatory visions of their futures and a long term orientation rather than counting on the future being much like the past.

"in my opinion, we ought to stop making our own drums and accept that outside supplier's offer," said wim niewindt, managing director of antilles refining, n. v., of aruba. "at a price of $21 per drum, we would be paying $4.70 less than it costs us to manufacture the drums in our own plant. since we use 70,000 drums a year, that would be an annual cost savings of $329,000." antilles refining's current cost to manufacture one drum is given below (based on 70,000 drums per year):

What do you recommend adam do to increase production in a business setting that does not seem to value high productivity?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?