Business, 05.07.2021 19:30, paolacorazza
Caleb is a manager at a small diner in a tourist town. There are many competing restaurants in the area, so the restaurant owners depend on Caleb and his employees to pay attention to what customers order most often to determine what the daily and weekly specials should be. Caleb has the authority to make changes to the menu and offer promotions to attract more customers. What type of organization does Caleb manage?
Answers: 2
Business, 22.06.2019 11:10, takaralocklear
An insurance company estimates the probability of an earthquake in the next year to be 0.0015. the average damage done to a house by an earthquake it estimates to be $90,000. if the company offers earthquake insurance for $150, what is company`s expected value of the policy? hint: think, is it profitable for the insurance company or not? will they gain (positive expected value) or lose (negative expected value)? if the expected value is negative, remember to show "-" sign. no "+" sign needed for the positive expected value
Answers: 2
Business, 22.06.2019 16:40, yoooo9313
An electronics store is running a promotion where for every video game purchased, the customer receives a coupon upon checkout to purchase a second game at a 50% discount. the coupons expire in one year. the store normally recognized a gross profit margin of 40% of the selling price on video games. how would the store account for a purchase using the discount coupon?
Answers: 3
Business, 23.06.2019 00:00, silonis21
1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?
Answers: 3
Caleb is a manager at a small diner in a tourist town. There are many competing restaurants in the a...
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