When they act as a profit-maximizing cartel, the total industry profit in the flowers market is per day. Suppose the flowers each company produces are regarded as perfect substitutes, such that if either company charged a price lower than the other, that company would receive all the business and profits in the industry. If both firms attempt to undercut each other, however, the result would be pricing at marginal cost and zero profit for both firms. The two firms intend to operate together in this market indefinitely, and at the beginning of each day, both firms individually choose whether to continue charging the collusive price. A firm that undercuts in a given month will receive (almost) the entire monopoly profit in that period, but no profit in any future periods. If the probability that both firms will continue operating and charging the collusive price in the next period is 0.60, then the expected stream of profits for one firm in the collusive equilibrium is . Tacit collusion is therefore in this scenario. Suppose a third firm with the exact same costs and similarly substitutable flowers enters the market. If this firm joins the cartel, the expected stream of profits for an individual firm is now (again assuming a probability of 0.60 that production occurs in the next period). In this case, a tacit collusive agreement is