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Other questions on the subject: Business
Business, 22.06.2019 20:20, isabelperez063
Why is it easier for new entrants to get involved in radical innovations when compared to incumbent firms? a. unlike incumbent firms, new entrants do not have to face the high entry barriers, initially. b. new entrants are embedded in an innovation ecosystem, while incumbent firms are not. c. unlike incumbent firms, new entrants do not have formal organizational structures and processes. d. incumbent firms do not have the advantages of network effects that new entrants have.
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Business, 22.06.2019 22:50, emanuelmorales1515
Amonopolist’s inverse demand function is p = 150 – 3q. the company produces output at two facilities; the marginal cost of producing at facility 1 is mc1(q1) = 6q1, and the marginal cost of producing at facility 2 is mc2(q2) = 2q2.a. provide the equation for the monopolist’s marginal revenue function. (hint: recall that q1 + q2 = q.)mr(q) = 150 - 6 q1 - 3 q2b. determine the profit-maximizing level of output for each facility. output for facility 1: output for facility 2: c. determine the profit-maximizing price.$
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Business, 22.06.2019 23:50, jtroutt74
Juniper company, inc. uses a perpetual inventory system. the company purchased $9,750 of merchandise on august 7 with terms 1/10, n/30. on august 11, it returned $1,500 worth of merchandise. on august 16, it paid the full amount due. the correct journal entry to record the payment on august 16 is:
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Business, 23.06.2019 00:00, silonis21
1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?
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