Roman Holiday checked into Windy Manor, a bed and breakfast hotel, for the weekend. While dressing for dinner in his room at Windy Manor, Roman had a massive heart attack and died instantly. His body was discovered the next morning when a trash can fire in the vending machine room set off the fire alarm, and firefighter broke down his door to "rescue" him. Several days later, local officials announce that Windy Manor does not have a functioning fire sprinkler system as is required by state law. Roman’s heirs sued Windy Manor for negligence. In this case, Windy Manor’s best argument is that:

Alandowner entered into a written agreement with a real estate broker whereby the broker would receive a commission of 10% of the sale price if he procured a "ready, willing, and able buyer" for the landowner's property and if the sale actually proceeded through closing. the broker found a buyer who agreed in writing to buy the property from the landowner for $100,000, the landowner's asking price. the buyer put up $6,000 as a down payment. the agreement between the landowner and the buyer contained a liquidated damages clause providing that, if the buyer defaulted by failing to tender the balance due of $94,000 at the closing date, damages would be 10% of the purchase price. the landowner included that clause because she was counting on using the proceeds of the sale for a business venture that would likely net her at least $10,000. the buyer became seriously ill and defaulted. when he recovered, he demanded that the landowner return his $6,000, and the landowner refused. the broker also demanded the $6,000 from the landowner and was refused. the broker and the buyer filed separate suits against the landowner, with the buyer pleading impossibility of performance. the two cases are consolidated into a single case. how should the court rule as to the disposition of the $6,000?

Describe the three different ways the argument section of a cover letter can be formatted

Many potential buyers value high-quality used cars at the full-information market price of € p1 and lemons at € p2. a limited number of potential sellers value high-quality cars at € v1 ≤ p1 and lemons at € v2 ≤ p2. everyone is risk neutral. the share of lemons among all the used cars that might be potentially sold is € θ . suppose that the buyers incur a transaction cost of $200 to purchase a car. this transaction cost is the value of their time to find a car. what is the equilibrium? is it possible that no cars are sold