In 1999, sean fanning, john fanning, and sean parker invented napster, a global, free-of-charge, peer-to-peer music sharing program. prior to napster, no such program existed. the three men created

Which of the following is a competitive benefit experienced by the first mover firm in an industry? a. the first mover will be able to achieve a less steep learning curve. b. the first mover will be able to reduce the switching costs. c. the first mover will not have to patent its products or technology. d. the first mover will be able to reduce costs through economies of scale.

This problem has been solved! see the answerthe xyz corporation is interested in possible differences in days worked by salaried employees in three departments in the financial area. a survey of 23 randomly chosen employees reveals the data shown below. because of the casual sampling methodology in this survey, the sample sizes are unequal. research question: are the mean annual attendance rates the same for employees in these three departments? days worked last year by 23 employees department days worked budgets (5 workers) 278 260 265 245 258 payables (10 workers) 205 270 220 240 255 217 266 239 240 228 pricing (8 workers) 240 258 233 256 233 242 244 249 picture click here for the excel data filefill in the missing data. (round your p-value to 4 decimal places, mean values to 1 decimal place and other answers to 2group mean n std. dev variancesbudgets payables pricing total one factor anova source ss df ms f p-value treatment error total

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?