Asalesperson with sales intelligence will most likely be able to create value for a prospect by having an understanding of the

Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1

Gather reliable information to brent make his decision. to gather this information, use newspapers, call insurance companies or look at their web sites, and review consumer magazines and web sites. also, look at the manufacturer web site or for information about gas mileage. list the sources you use and take notes.

Starting at age 30, you deposit $2000 a year into an ira account for retirement. treat the yearly deposits into the account as a continuous income stream. if money in the account earns 7%, compounded continuously, how much will be in the account 35 years later, when you retire at age 65? how much of the final amount is interest?