Afamily is a. a group of genetically similar people b. a group of people we work with at a job c. a group of people closely connected by birth, marriage, adoption, or choice d. both a and c

On the first day of the fiscal year, a company issues an $7,500,000, 8%, five-year bond that pays semiannual interest of $300,000 ($7,500,000 × 8% × ½), receiving cash of $7,740,000. journalize the first interest payment and the amortization of the related bond premium. round to the nearest dollar. if an amount box does not require an entry, leave it blank.

Pam is a low-risk careful driver and fran is a high-risk aggressive driver. to reveal their driver types, an auto-insurance company a. refuses to insure high-risk drivers b. charges a higher premium to owners of newer cars than to owners of older cars c. offers policies that enable drivers to reveal their private information d. uses a pooling equilibrium e. requires drivers to categorize themselves as high-risk or low-risk on the application form

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?