Supply for clothing decreased which means suppliers will not supply clothes at each price level
the same
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White company has two departments, cutting and finishing. the company uses a job-order costing system and computes a predetermined overhead rate in each department. the cutting department bases its rate on machine-hours, and the finishing department bases its rate on direct labor-hours. at the beginning of the year, the company made the following estimates: department cutting finishing direct labor-hours 6,000 30,000 machine-hours 48,000 5,000 total fixed manufacturing overhead cost $ 264,000 $ 366,000 variable manufacturing overhead per machine-hour $ 2.00 " variable manufacturing overhead per direct labor-hour " $ 4.00 required: 1. compute the predetermined overhead rate for each department. 2. the job cost sheet for job 203, which was started and completed during the year, showed the following: department cutting finishing direct labor-hours 6 20 machine-hours 80 4 direct materials $ 500 $ 310 direct labor cost $ 108 $ 360 using the predetermined overhead rates that you computed in requirement (1), compute the total manufacturing cost assigned to job 203. 3. would you expect substantially different amounts of overhead cost to be assigned to some jobs if the company used a plantwide predetermined overhead rate based on direct labor-hours, rather than using departmental rates?

Which represents a surplus in the market? a market price equals equilibrium price. b quantity supplied is greater than quantity demanded. c market price is less than equilibrium price. d quantity supplied equals quantity demanded.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?