Andy Hastings borrowed 500 shares of stock from a broker. This stock is currently selling for $25 a share ($12,500). The commission was $125. Three weeks later, the price of the stock was $22.50 a share, so he bought the 500 shares. The commission was $115. He returned a stock certificate for 500 shares to the broker. What is the rates of return?

Exercise 18-15 sheffield appliance center is an experienced home appliance dealer. sheffield appliance center also offers a number of services for the home appliances that it sells. assume that sheffield appliance center sells ovens on a standalone basis. sheffield appliance center also sells installation services and maintenance services for ovens. however, sheffield appliance center does not offer installation or maintenance services to customers who buy ovens from other vendors. pricing for ovens is as follows. oven only $790 oven with installation service 850 oven with maintenance services 970 oven with installation and maintenance services 990 in each instance in which maintenance services are provided, the maintenance service is separately priced within the arrangement at $180. additionally, the incremental amount charged by sheffield appliance center for installation approximates the amount charged by independent third parties. ovens are sold subject to a general right of return. if a customer purchases an oven with installation and/or maintenance services, in the event sheffield appliance center does not complete the service satisfactorily, the customer is only entitled to a refund of the portion of the fee that exceeds $790. assume that a customer purchases an oven with both installation and maintenance services for $990. (b) indicate the amount of revenue that should be allocated to the oven, the installation, and to the maintenance contract.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?

Suppose the government decides to issue a new savings bond that is guaranteed to double in value if you hold it for 20 years. assume you purchase a bond that costs $25. a. what is the exact rate of return you would earn if you held the bond for 20 years until it doubled in value? (do not round intermediate calculations and enter your answer as a percent rounded to 2 decimal places, e. g., 32.16.) b. if you purchased the bond for $25 in 2017 at the then current interest rate of .27 percent year, how much would the bond be worth in 2027? (do not round intermediate calculations and round your answer to 2 decimal places, e. g., 32.16.) c. in 2027, instead of cashing in the bond for its then current value, you decide to hold the bond until it doubles in face value in 2037. what annual rate of return will you earn over the last 10 years? (do not