MegaCable and Acme are competing for an exclusive contract to provide the city of Dustin with cable television for the next year. The firm that wins the contract will earn an economic profit of $5 million. The contact will be awarded to the firm that spends the most on lobbying. If both firms spend the same amount on lobbying, then the winner will be determined by a coin flip, so each will have a 50 percent chance of winning. The socially optimal amount for each firm to spend on lobbying is . Select one: a. $0 b. $2,500,000 c. $5,000,000 d. $10,000,000

Your mother's well-diversified portfolio has an expected return of 12.0% and a beta of 1.20. she is in the process of buying 100 shares of safety corp. at $10 a share and adding it to her portfolio. safety has an expected return of 15.0% and a beta of 2.00. the total value of your current portfolio is $9,000. what will the expected return and beta on the portfolio be after the purchase of the safety stock?

Specialization—the division of labor—enhances productivity and efficiency by a) allowing workers to take advantage of existing differences in their abilities and skills. b) avoiding the time loss involved in shifting from one production task to another. c) allowing workers to develop skills by working on one, or a limited number, of tasks. d)all of the means identified in the other answers.

Suppose that two firms produce differentiated products and compete in prices. as in class, the two firms are located at two ends of a line one mile apart. consumers are evenly distributed along the line. the firms have identical marginal cost, $60. firm b produces a product with value $110 to consumers. firm a (located at 0 on the unit line) produces a higher quality product with value $120 to consumers. the cost of travel are directly related to the distance a consumer travels to purchase a good. if a consumerhas to travel a mile to purchase a good, the incur a cost of $20. if they have to travel x fraction of a mile, they incur a cost of $20x. (a) write down the expressions for how much a consumer at location d would value the products sold by firms a and b, if they set prices p_{a} and p_{b} ? (b) based on your expressions in (a), how much will be demanded from each firm if prices p_{a} and p_{b} are set? (c) what are the nash equilibrium prices?