The YTM on 1-year zero coupon bonds is 5% and the YTM on 2-year zero coupon bonds is 6%. The YTM on 2-year maturity coupon bonds with coupon rates of 15% (paid annually) is 5.8%. Assume the face value of bonds is $1,000. What should be the price of this 2-year maturity coupon bond, if we use no-arbitrage pricing approach based on the zero-coupon bonds

In return for their with optimizing his painting project, the castle servant informed poly and digit that he saw someone dressed as the king leaving behind a trail of crumbs as he walked into the jester's room late last night. poly and digit have finally found the crisp-collecting culprit — it turns out the jester's shoe size and hair color match the clues that were found! in gratitude, poly and digit agree to the servant with his current task of replacing all of the tables and chairs in the castle. his goal is to determine which furniture company should produce the new furniture. he receives information from a company that customizes elegant furniture, and he wants to analyze the company's production process in order to calculate some problems about cost and availability. read the following scenario, and assist poly and digit as they the servant with his calculations. the fit for a king furniture company requires 2020 hours of labor to produce a standard table, and a chair requires 1212 hours of labor. the labor available is 565565 hours per week. the company can produce at most 3535 chairs per week.

To : of $25 up to 35 2 35 up to 45 5 45 up to 55 7 55 up to 65 20 65 up to 75 16 is$25 up to $35 ?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?