Istg if keyonn deletes one more of my questions I'm gonna stomp on a bird.​

Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1

Technology corp. is considering a $238,160 investment in a new marketing campaign that it anticipates will provide annual cash flows of $52,000 for the next five years. the firm has a 6% cost of capital. what should the analysis indicate to the firm's managers?

Suppose general motors demands labor according to the labor demand function 푤푤= 40−0. 5퐸퐸, where 푤푤 is the hourly wage and 퐸퐸 is the number of employees. the united auto workers union has a utility function given by 푈푈=푊푊∗퐸퐸. a. in 1984, the united auto workers union started negotiations with general motors by assuming that they were a monopoly union. find the wage and employment demands that the united auto workers union would have demanded before any bargaining began. b. if general motors and the united auto workers union both had excellent bargaining representatives, would this be the final labor contract? if not, then explain in words and graphically where they would end up after the bargaining process.