An investment project requires an initial outlay of $8,000 and will produce a return of $17,000 at the end of 5 years. Use the a) Net present value; b) Internal rate of return methods to decide whether this is worthwhile if the capital could be invested elsewhere at 15% compounded annually

Nichols inc. manufactures remote controls. currently the company uses a plantminuswide rate for allocating manufacturing overhead. the plant manager is considering switchingminusover to abc costing system and has asked the accounting department to identify the primary production activities and their cost drivers which are as follows: activities cost driver allocation rate material handling number of parts $5 per part assembly labor hours $20 per hour inspection time at inspection station $10 per minute the current traditional cost method allocates overhead based on direct manufacturing labor hours using a rate of $20 per labor hour. what are the indirect manufacturing costs per remote control assuming an method is used and a batch of 10 remote controls are produced? the batch requires 100 parts, 5 direct manufacturing labor hours, and 3 minutes of inspection time.

On july 7, you purchased 500 shares of wagoneer, inc. stock for $21 a share. on august 1, you sold 200 shares of this stock for $28 a share. you sold an additional 100 shares on august 17 at a price of $25 a share. the company declared a $0.95 per share dividend on august 4 to holders of record as of wednesday, august 15. this dividend is payable on september 1. how much dividend income will you receive on september 1 as a result of your ownership of wagoneer stock

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?