The accounts in the ledger of Cullumber Company contain the following balances on July 31, 2022. Accounts Receivable $11,900 Prepaid Insurance $1,950 Accounts Payable 7,900 Maintenance and Repairs Expense 1,100 Cash 16,930 Service Revenue 17,700 Equipment 59,600 Dividends 750 Gasoline Expense 950 Common Stock 36,000 Insurance Expense 570 Salaries and Wages Expense 8,500 Notes Payable, due 2020 32,000 Salaries and Wages Payable 900 Retained Earnings (July 1, 2022) 7,750 (a) Prepare an income statement for the month of July 2022. CULLUMBER COMPANY Income Statement choose the accounting period select an opening name for section one enter an income statement item $enter a dollar amount select an opening name for section two enter an income statement item $enter a dollar amount enter an income statement item enter a dollar amount enter an income statement item enter a dollar amount enter an income statement item enter a dollar amount

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?