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Meeting ID 897-909-6321
Password samantha

Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1

Employees of dti, inc. worked 1,600 direct labor hours in january and 1,000 direct labor hours in february. dti expects to use 18,000 direct labor hours during the year, and expects to incur $22,500 of worker’s compensation insurance cost for the year. the cash payment for this cost will be paid in april. how much insurance premium should be allocated to products made in january and february?

Match each item to check for while reconciling a bank account with the document to which it relates. (there's not just one answer) 1. balancing account statement 2. balancing check register a. nsf fees b. deposits in transit c. interest earned d. bank errors