The price of labor is $1,000 per day, and the price of capital is $3,000 per day. To hire inputs in a cost-minimizing way, the firm should

Grant, inc., acquired 30% of south co.’s voting stock for $200,000 on january 2, year 1, and did not elect the fair value option. the price equaled the carrying amount and the fair value of the interest purchased in south’s net assets. grant’s 30% interest in south gave grant the ability to exercise significant influence over south’s operating and financial policies. during year 1, south earned $80,000 and paid dividends of $50,000. south reported earnings of $100,000 for the 6 months ended june 30, year 2, and $200,000 for the year ended december 31, year 2. on july 1, year 2, grant sold half of its stock in south for $150,000 cash. south paid dividends of $60,000 on october 1, year 2. before income taxes, what amount should grant include in its year 1 income statement as a result of the investment?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?

You park your car on sixth street and walk over to the quad for lunch. while crossing wright street, you are hit by a bicyclist and knocked to the ground. you hit your head so hard you are knocked out. when you wake up, the person who hit you is gone. you incur $45,000 in medical bills. the person who hit you would be liable for $150,000 in damages if you could find them. your policy will pay: