On January 1, 2021, Tropical Paradise borrows $50,000 by agreeing to a 6%, six-year note with the bank. The funds will be used to purchase a new BMW convertible for use in promoting resort properties to potential customers. Loan payments of $828.64 are due at the end of each month with the first installment due on January 31, 2021. Required:

Record the issuance of the installment note payable and the first two monthly payments.

University hero is considering expanding operations beyond its healthy sandwiches. jim axelrod, vice president of marketing, would like to add a line of smoothies with a similar health emphasis. each smoothie would include two free health supplements such as vitamins, antioxidants, and protein. jim believes smoothie sales should fill the slow mid-afternoon period. adding the line of smoothies would require purchasing additional freezer space, machinery, and equipment. jim provides the following projections of net sales, net income, and average total assets in support of his proposal. sandwichesonly sandwiches and smoothies net sales $ 750,000 $ 1,350,000 net income 120,000 210,000 average total assets 350,000 750,000 return on assetschoose numerator ÷ choose denominator = return on assets÷ = return on assets÷ = profit margin÷ = profit margin÷ = asset turnover÷ = asset turnover÷ = times

Which of the following best explains why the demand for housing is more flexible than the supply? a. new housing developments are being constructed all the time. b. low interest rates for mortgages make buying a home very affordable. c. the increasing population always drives demand upwards. d. people can move more easily than producers can build new homes.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?