7. If you make $35,000.00 a year and your company buys accidental life insurance for you that covers your life with 3x coverage, how much would your beneficiary receive if you accidentally die?

Information on gerken power co., is shown below. assume the company’s tax rate is 40 percent. debt: 9,400 8.4 percent coupon bonds outstanding, $1,000 par value, 21 years to maturity, selling for 100.5 percent of par; the bonds make semiannual payments. common stock: 219,000 shares outstanding, selling for $83.90 per share; beta is 1.24. preferred stock: 12,900 shares of 5.95 percent preferred stock outstanding, currently selling for $97.10 per share. market: 7.2 percent market risk premium and 5 percent risk-free rate. required: calculate the company's wacc. (do not round intermediate calculations and enter your answer as a percent rounded to 2 decimal places, e. g., 32.16.) wacc %

Alarge university wanted to study the relationship between completing an internship during college and students' future earning potential. prom the same graduating class, they selected a random sample of 80 students who completed an internship and 100 students who did not complete an internship and examined their salaries five years after graduation. they found that there was a statistically higher mean salary for the internship group than for the noninternship group. which of the following interpretations is the most appropriate? a. there could be a confounding variable, such as student major, that explains the difference in mean salary between the internship and no internship groups. b. we cannot infer anything from these data since the distribution of salaries is likely right skewed. c. you cannot draw any valid conclusions because the sample sizes are different. d. more students should complete internships because having an internship produces a higher salary.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?