Here are some free points!

Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1

Bernard made a gift of $500,000 to his brother in 2014. due to bernard’s prior taxable gifts he paid $200,000 of gift tax. when bernard died in 2019, the applicable gift tax credit had increased. at bernard’s death, what amount related to the $500,000 gift to his brother is included in his gross estate?

On july 7, you purchased 500 shares of wagoneer, inc. stock for $21 a share. on august 1, you sold 200 shares of this stock for $28 a share. you sold an additional 100 shares on august 17 at a price of $25 a share. the company declared a $0.95 per share dividend on august 4 to holders of record as of wednesday, august 15. this dividend is payable on september 1. how much dividend income will you receive on september 1 as a result of your ownership of wagoneer stock