RATE ME 1-100 pls i need a new bf

Hank itzek manufactures and sells homemade wine, and he wants to develop a standard cost per gallon. the following are required for production of a 70-gallon batch. 2,700 ounces of grape concentrate at $0.04 per ounce 77 pounds of granulated sugar at $0.43 per pound 133 lemons at $0.79 each 350 yeast tablets at $0.24 each 350 nutrient tablets at $0.14 each 2,500 ounces of water at $0.001 per ounce hank estimates that 4% of the grape concentrate is wasted, 9% of the sugar is lost, and 32% of the lemons cannot be used. compute the standard cost of the ingredients for one gallon of wine. (round intermediate calculations and final answer to 2 decimal places, e. g.

The company is experiencing an increase in competition, and at the same time they are building more production facilities in southeast asia. in this scenario, the top management team is most likely to multiple choice increase the cost of their products. restructure to reflect a more bureaucratic, stable organization. pull decision-making responsibility from low-level management, taking it on themselves. give lower-level managers the authority to make decisions to benefit the firm. rid themselves of all buffering product.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?