On November 15, 2018, Shields Company purchased inventory costing $6,200 on credit. The credit terms were 2/10, n/30. a. Assume that Shields Company paid the invoice on November 23, 2018. Prepare journal entries to record the purchase of this inventory and the cash payment to the supplier using the net-of-discount method.

Security a has a higher standard deviation of returns than security b. we would expect that: (i) security a would have a risk premium equal to security b. (ii) the likely range of returns for security a in any given year would be higher than the likely range of returns for security b. (iii) the sharpe ratio of a will be higher than the sharpe ratio of b. (a) i only (b) i and ii only (c) ii and iii only (d) i, ii and iii

If the economy were in the contracting phase of the business cycle, how might that affect your ability to find work?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?