On July 1, 2020, Culver Inc. made two sales. 1. It sold land having a fair value of $902,220 in exchange for a 4-year zero-interest-bearing promissory note in the face amount of $1,419,656. The land is carried on Culver's books at a cost of $590,900. 2. It rendered services in exchange for a 3%, 8-year promissory note having a face value of $402,150 (interest payable annually). Culver Inc. recently had to pay 8% interest for money that it borrowed from British National Bank. The customers in these two transactions have credit ratings that require them to borrow money at 12% interest. Record the two journal entries that should be recorded by Sunland Inc. for the sales transactions above that took place on July 1, 2020. (Round present value factor calculations to 5 decimal places, e. g. 1.25124 and final answers to 0 decimal places, e. g. 5,275. If no entry is required, select "No Entry" for the account titles and enter o for the amounts. Credit account titles are automatically indented when the amount is entered. Do not indent manually.)
No. Date Account Titles and Explanation Debit Credit
1. July 1, 2020
2. July 1, 2020

Abond purchased for $950 was sold for $980 after one year. the interest received during the year is $25. the bond's yield is:

Ellen and george work for the same company. ellen, a gen xer, really appreciates the flextime opportunities, while george, a baby boomer, takes advantage of the free computer training offered at the company. these policies are examples of

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?