Calculating Returns and Standard Deviations LO 1 Consider the following information: Rate of Return if State Occurs State of Probability of State Economy of Economy Stock A Stock B
Recession .24 .030 -.29
Normal .59 .110 .19
Boom .17 .180 .42
Requirement 1: Calculate the expected return for the two stocks. (Do not round intermediate calculations. Enter your answers as a percentage rounded to 2 decimal places (e. g., 32.16).) Expected return E(RA) % E(RB) %
Requirement 2: Calculate the standard deviation for the two stocks. (Do not round intermediate calculations. Enter your answers as a percentage rounded to 2 decimal places (e. g., 32.16).) Standard deviation ?A % ?B %

Why are the four primary service outputs of spatial convenience, lot size, waiting time, and product variety important to logistics management? provide examples of competing firms that differ in the level of each service output provided to customers?

In the 1970s, kmart used blue light specials to encourage customers to flock to a particular department having a temporary sale. a spinning blue light activated for approximately 30 seconds, and then an in-store announcement informed shoppers of the special savings in the specific department. over time, loyal kmart shoppers learned to flock to the department with the spinning blue light before any announcement of special savings occurred. if kmart was employing classical conditioning techniques, what role did the spinning blue light play?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?