Using departmental rates, assign overhead to the two products and calculate the overhead cost per unit. How does this compare with the plantwide rate unit cost, using direct labor hours

Acountry made education free in mandatory up to age 15. it is established 100 new schools to educate kids across the country. as a result, citizens acquired the _ required to work. the school's generated _ for teachers and other staff. in 20 years, to countryside rapid _ and its gdp.

Indicate whether each of the following companies is primarily a service, merchandise, or manufacturing business. if you are unfamiliar with the company, use the internet to locate the company's home page or use the finance web site of yahoo. 1. alcoa inc. 2. boeing 3. caterpillar 4. citigroup inc. 5. cvs 6. dow chemical company 7. ebay inc. 8. fedex 9. ford motor company 10. gap inc. 11. h& r block 12. hilton hospitality, inc. 13. procter & gamble 14. suntrust 15. walmart stores, inc.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?