Consider a second hand car market where three types of cars are being sold: High quality (H), medium quality (M) and low quality (L). Sellers value an H at $2000, an M at $1200 and an L at $800, whereas buyers value an H at $1800, an M at $1600 and an L at $1400. As discussed in the "Akerloff's Lemons Market", sellers are able to distinguish between different quality cars but buyers are not and a buyer believes that in this market 40% of the cars is an H, 30% of the cars is an M and 30% of the cars is an L. a) Determine which type of cars will be sold at the efficient allocation. b) Determine which type of cars will be sold at the market equilibrium.

a) Determine which type of cars will be sold at the efficient allocation.

All cars would be sold in a Pareto efficient allocation.

In a Pareto efficient market, resources are all allocated in teh most efficient possible way. This is the reason why this is just a theoretical concept that does not necessarily apply in real life.

b) Determine which type of cars will be sold at the market equilibrium.

Since consumers are only willing to pay up to $1,620 for a used car, only medium quality and low quality cars will be sold. The price of high quality used cars is higher than the equilibrium price.

Explanation:

the most a buyer would be willing to pay for a used car is ($1,800 x 40%) + ($1,600 x 30%) + ($1,400 x 30%) = $720 + $480 + $420 = $1,620

answer; risk transference;