se the starting balance sheet, income statement, and the list of changes to answer the question. Nippon Technology Balance Sheet As of December 31, 2019 (amounts in thousands) Cash 37,000 Liabilities 24,000 Other Assets 39,000 Equity 52,000 Total Assets 76,000 Total Liabilities & Equity 76,000 Nippon Technology Income Statement January 1 to March 31, 2020 (amounts in thousands) Revenue 5,800 Expenses 3,400 Net Income 2,400 Between January 1 and March 31, 2020: 1. Other Assets increase by $300,000 2. Liabilities decrease by $200,000 3. Paid-In Capital does not change 4. Dividends paid of $100,000 What is the value for Cash on March 31, 2020? Note: Account change amounts are provided in dollars but the financial statement units are thousands of dollars. Please specify your answer in the same units as the financial statements (i. e., enter the number from your updated balance sheet).

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Our uncle has $300,000 invested at 7.5%, and he now wants to retire. he wants to withdraw $35,000 at the end of each year, starting at the end of this year. he also wants to have $25,000 left to give you when he ceases to withdraw funds from the account. for how many years can he make the $35,000 withdrawals and still have $25,000 left in the end? a. 14.21b. 14.96c. 15.71d. 16.49e. 17.32

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?