"You are in talks to settle a potential lawsuit. The defendant has offered to make annual payments of $30,000, $34,000, $70,000, and $105,000 to you each year over the next four years, respectively. All payments will be made at the end of the year. If the appropriate interest rate is 5.2 percent, what is the value of the settlement offer today

Atoy store has a new game in stock, but customers aren't buying it. which of the following types of inventory increases when customers aren't buying this game? a. work-in-process b. raw materials c. finished goods d. in-transit

Suppose that the u. s. dollars-mexican pesos exchange rate is fixed by the u. s. and mexican governments. assume also that labor is mobile between the united states and mexico due to low transportation costs. which of the following situations is likely to happen as a result of a simultaneous increase in the demand for u. s. goods and decrease in the demand for mexican goods? (pick mexican unemployment rate increases, and the country undergoes bad economic times for a sustained u. s. unemployment rate increases, and the country undergoes bad economic times for a sustained mexican unemployment rate rises at first, but it soon drops as unemployed mexicans move to the united states for mexican unemployment rate rises at first, but then it drops as mexican pesos depreciate against u. s. dollars.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?