The cost of plant in use with Hand sanitizer Ltd, a manufacturing firm on 1st April 2018 was GH¢ 375,000 against which the accumulated depreciation stood at GH¢ 157,500 on the date. The firm provided depreciation at 30% of the diminishing value. on 31st December 2018 two plants costing GH¢ 22500 and Gh¢ 18000 respectively, both purchased on 1st October 2015, had to be discarded because of damages and had to be replaced by two new plants costing GH¢ 30000 and GH¢ 22500 respectively. one of the discarded plants was sold for GH¢ 12000, against the other it was expected that GH¢ 4500 would be realisable. required: show the relevant accounts in the ledger of Hand sanitizer for the year ended 31st march 2019.

The common stock and debt of northern sludge are valued at $65 million and $35 million, respectively. investors currently require a return of 15.9% on the common stock and a return of 7.8% on the debt. if northern sludge issues an additional $14 million of common stock and uses this money to retire debt, what happens to the expected return on the stock? assume that the change in capital structure does not affect the interest rate on northern’s debt and that there are no taxes.

Spartan credit bank is offering 7.5 percent compounded daily on its savings accounts. you deposit $5,900 today. a. how much will you have in the account in 4 years? (use 365 days a year. do not round intermediate calculations and round your answer to 2 decimal places, e. g., 32.16.) b. how much will you have in the account in 12 years? (use 365 days a year. do not round intermediate calculations and round your answer to 2 decimal places, e. g., 32.16.) c. how much will you have in the account in 19 years?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?