Suppose the world price of steel falls substantially. The demand for labor ___ among steel-producing firms in Pennsylvania will ___ demand labor among automobile-producing firms in Michigan, for which steel is an input, will ___ resulting from such sectoral shifts in the economy is best described as ___ The temporary unemployment. Suppose the government wants to reduce this type of unemployment. Which of the following policies would help achieve this goal?
a. Improving a widely used job-search website so that it matches workers to job vacancies more effectively
b. Extending the number of weeks for which unemployed workers are eligible for unemployment insurance benefits from the government
c. Offering recipients of unemployment insurance benefits a cash bonus if they find a new job within a specified number of weeks

howard, fine, & howard is an advertising agency. the firm uses an activity-based costing system to allocate overhead costs to its services. information about the firm's activity cost pool rates follows: stooge company was a client of howard, fine, & howard. recently, 7 administrative assistant hours, 3 new ad campaigns, and 8 meeting hours were incurred for the stooge company account. using the activity-based costing system, how much overhead cost would be allocated to the stooge company account?

Almeda products, inc., uses a job-order costing system. the company's inventory balances on april 1, the start of its fiscal year, were as follows:

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?