Larry Nelson holds 1,000 shares of General Electric's (GE) common stock. The annual stockholder meeting is being held soon, but as a minor shareholder, Larry doesn't plan to attend. Larry did not sell his shares but gave his voting rights to the management group running General Electric (GE). Larry must have signed a that gives the management group control over his shares.

Options: Poison Pill, Proxy, Preemptive Right, Corporate Charter

Larry also holds 2,000 shares of common stock in a company that only has 20,000 shares outstanding. The company's stock currently is valued at $42.00 per share. The company needs to raise new capital to invest in production. The company is looking to issue 5,000 new shares at a price of $33.60 per share. Larry worries about the value of his investment.

Larry's current investment in the company is (a. $92,400, b. $84,000, c. $33,600, d. $50,400). If the company issues new shares and Larry makes no additional purchase, Larry's investment will be worth (a. $201,600, b. $84,000, c. $120,960, d. $80,640).

This scenario is an example of (a. a proxy, b. dilution, c. a takeover, d. a poison pill). Larry could be protected if the firm's corporate charter includes a (a. preemptive right, b. proxy) provision.

If Larry exercises the provision in the corporate charter to protect his stake, his investment value in the firm will become

(a. $75,600, b. $101,800, c. 108,100, d. $151,200).

Suppose that fizzo and pop hop are the only two firms that sell orange soda. the following payoff matrix shows the profit (in millions of dollars) each company will earn depending on whether or not it advertises: pop hopadvertise doesn’t advertisefizzo advertise 10, 10 18, 2doesn’t advertise 2, 18 11, 11for example, the upper right cell shows that if fizzo advertises and pop hop doesn't advertise, fizzo will make a profit of $18 million, and pop hop will make a profit of $2 million. assume this is a simultaneous game and that fizzo and pop hop are both profit-maximizing firms. if fizzo decides to advertise, it will earn a profit if pop hop advertises and a profit if pop hop does not advertise. if fizzo decides not to advertise, it will earn a profit if pop hop advertises and a profit if pop hop does not advertise. if pop hop advertises, fizzo makes a higher profit if it chooses (not to advertise, to .if pop hop doesn't advertise, fizzo makes a higher profit if it chooses (not to advertise, to . suppose that both firms start off not advertising. if the firms act independently, what strategies will they end up choosing? fizzo will choose to advertise and pop hop will choose not to advertise. both firms will choose to advertise. fizzo will choose not to advertise and pop hop will choose to advertise. both firms will choose not to advertise. again, suppose that both firms start off not advertising. if the firms decide to collude, what strategies will they end up choosing? fizzo will choose not to advertise and pop hop will choose to advertise. both firms will choose not to advertise. fizzo will choose to advertise and pop hop will choose not to advertise. both firms will choose to advertise.