Business, 04.04.2020 16:04, Jazzyyyy088888

Which statement best compares these two loans?

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Business, 22.06.2019 05:30, mem8163

U. s. internet advertising revenue grew at the rate of r(t) = 0.82t + 1.14 (0 ≤ t ≤ 4) billion dollars/year between 2002 (t = 0) and 2006 (t = 4). the advertising revenue in 2002 was $5.9 billion.† (a) find an expression f(t) giving the advertising revenue in year t.

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Business, 22.06.2019 07:10, mia7955

Refer to the payoff matrix. suppose that speedy bike and power bike are the only two bicycle manufacturing firms serving the market. both can choose large or small advertising budgets. is there a nash equilibrium solution to this game?

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Business, 22.06.2019 16:20, ashleyprescot05

Stosch company's balance sheet reported assets of $112,000, liabilities of $29,000 and common stock of $26,000 as of december 31, year 1. if retained earnings on the balance sheet as of december 31, year 2, amount to $74,000 and stosch paid a $28,000 dividend during year 2, then the amount of net income for year 2 was which of the following? a)$23,000 b) $35,000 c) $12,000 d)$42,000

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Business, 23.06.2019 00:00, silonis21

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?