Ser Bronn has made a reputation for himself as a gifted sell-sword who sells his services to people awaiting Trial by Combat. The demand for sell-sword services in the kingdom of Vale is p = 120=Q, where p is the price when Q is the total number of Trials by Combat fought by sell-swords. Ser Bronn is the only sell-sword in the kingdom of Vale currently providing such services, and is thus producing the monopoly output level. Sandor Clegane, a traveling warrior who recently entered the kingdom, gets enticed by the promise of wealth and becomes a potential entrant in this sell-sword business. If both sell-swords operate in this market, they would have to settle for Cournot duopoly outputs and prots. Ser Bronn would like to deter entry; however, he cannot commit to the monopoly output after entry. Each sell-sword has a marginal cost of 1If Ser Bronn can pay a fee to the corrupt Lord Protector of the Vale (Lord Baelish) for exclusive rights to the market, what is the largest fee he would be willing to pay to prevent entry? (Hint: Start by nding the monopoly and Cournot duopoly prots. He would pay a fee that would make him indierent between preventing and accommodating entry.)How much would Ser Bronn and Sandor produce together if they instead could agree on a collusive outcome? (The collusive outcome is where rms together produce the monopoly output and then share the monopoly prots) Show that the total prot under collusion (monopoly prot) is more than what they were collectively making in the Cournot outcome.