During the a recession, the government of Cashland flooded several banking, financial services, and insurance firms with government funds in exchange (at least temporarily) for government ownership rights. This move signaled the government's concern that the global banking system might collapse if these firms ended up in bankruptcy. This decision for government involvement in these firms demonstrates:a. the unforgiving nature of capitalism.

b. the desire for more individuals in the u. s. to live under a socialist system.

c. the trend toward mostly capitalist nations to move toward socialism.

d. the freedoms the u. s. government has under capitalism.

All else being equal, which is true about a firm with high operating leverage relative to a firm with low operating leverage? select one: a. a higher percentage of the high operating leverage firm's costs are fixed. b. the high operating leverage firm is exposed to less risk. c. the debt payments limit the high operating leverage firm's opportunities to turn a big profit. d. the high operating leverage firm has more debt.

Minneapolis federal reserve bank economist edward prescott estimates the elasticity of the u. s. labor supply to be 3. given this elasticity, what would be the impact of funding the social security program with tax increases on the number of hours worked and on the amount of taxes collected to fund social security?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?