Ryan Co. sells major household appliance service contracts for cash. The service contracts are for a 1-year, 2-year, or 3-year period. Cash receipts from contracts are credited to unearned service contract revenues. This account had a balance of $720,000 at December 31, Year 1, before year-end adjustment. Service contract costs are charged as incurred to the service contract expense account, which had a balance of $180,000 at December 31, Year 1. Outstanding service contracts at December 31, Year 1, expire as follows:
During Year 2
-
$150,000
During Year 3
-
225,000
During Year 4
-
100,000
What amount should be reported as unearned service contract revenues in Ryan's December 31, Year 1, balance sheet?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?