Morataya Corporation has two manufacturing departments--Machining and Assembly. The company used the following data at the beginning of the year to calculate predetermined overhead rates: Machining Assembly Total Estimated total machine-hours (MHs) 7,000 3,000 10,000 Estimated total fixed manufacturing overhead cost $39,200 $6,600 $45,800 Estimated variable manufacturing overhead cost- per MH $1.90 $2.10 During the most recent month, the company started and completed two jobs--Job B and Job G. There were no beginning inventories. Data concerning those two jobs follow: Job B Job G Direct materials $14,800 $8,300 Direct labor cost $22,000 $ 8,900 Machining machine-hours 4,800 2,200 Assembly machine-hours 1,200 1,800 Assume that the company uses a plantwide predetermined manufacturing overhead rate based on machine-hours. That predetermined manufacturing overhead rate is closest to:a) $4.00 b) $7.50 c) $4.58 d) $6.54

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?