The Heath Corporation reported net income for 2018 of $177,500. Heath began the year with 100,000 shares of $5 par value common shares outstanding and 2,500 shares of $100 par value 8% preferred shares outstanding. On October 1, Heath sold 10,000 shares of common stock for $6 per share. Heath paid dividends to the common shareholders in December. If each share of preferred stock is convertible into 8 shares of common stock, the diluted earnings per share for 2018 is (rounded):

Kevin comes across people from various cultures in his job. kevin should deal with people from other cultures with blank . he should communicate by actively

Zapper has beginning equity of $257,000, net income of $51,000, dividends of $40,000 and investments by stockholders of $6,000. its ending equity is

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?