" refers to the use of key performance indicators to monitor performance of the entire supply chain, including sourcing, planning, production, and distribution. Group of answer choices Demand forecasting Supply network collaboration Supply chain visibility Supply chain efficiency Supply chain analytics"

For a multistate lottery, the following probability distribution represents the cash prizes of the lottery with their corresponding probabilities. complete parts (a) through (c) below. x (cash prize, $) p(x) grand prizegrand prize 0.000000008860.00000000886 200,000 0.000000390.00000039 10,000 0.0000016950.000001695 100 0.0001582930.000158293 7 0.0039114060.003911406 4 0.0080465690.008046569 3 0.012865710.01286571 0 0.975015928140.97501592814 (a) if the grand prize is $13 comma 000 comma 00013,000,000, find and interpret the expected cash prize. if a ticket costs $1, what is your expected profit from one ticket? the expected cash prize is $nothing.

Assume the perpetual inventory method is used. 1) the company purchased $12,500 of merchandise on account under terms 2/10, n/30. 2) the company returned $1,200 of merchandise to the supplier before payment was made. 3) the liability was paid within the discount period. 4) all of the merchandise purchased was sold for $18,800 cash. what effect will the return of merchandise to the supplier have on the accounting equation?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?