The local supermarket buys lettuce each day to ensure really fresh produce. Each morning any lettuce that is left from the previous day is sold to a dealer that resells it to farmers who use it to feed their animals. This week the supermarket can buy fresh lettuce for $12.00 a box. The lettuce is sold for $25.00 a box and the dealer that sells old lettuce is willing to pay $3.50 a box. Past history says that tomorrow's demand for lettuce averages 280 boxes with a standard deviation of 46 boxes. How many boxes of lettuce should the supermarket purchase tomorrow? (Use Excel's NORMSINV() function to find the Z-score. Round intermediate calculations to four decimal places. Round your answer to the nearest whole number.)

Suppose jamal purchases a pair of running shoes online for $60. if his state has a sales tax on clothing of 6 percent, how much is he required to pay in state sales tax?

Areal estate agent is considering changing her cell phone plan. there are three plans to choose from, all of which involve a monthly service charge of $20. plan a has a cost of $.42 a minute for daytime calls and $.17 a minute for evening calls. plan b has a charge of $.52 a minute for daytime calls and $.15 a minute for evening calls. plan c has a flat rate of $80 with 275 minutes of calls allowed per month and a charge of $.38 per minute beyond that, day or evening. a. determine the total charge under each plan for this case: 150 minutes of day calls and 70 minutes of evening calls in a month. (do not round intermediate calculations. round your answer to 2 decimal places. omit the "$" sign in your response.)c. if the agent will use the service for daytime calls, over what range of call minutes will each plan be optimal? (round each answer to the nearest whole number. include the indifference point itself in each answer.)d. suppose that the agent expects both daytime and evening calls. at what point (i. e., percentage of total call minutes used for daytime calls) would she be indifferent between plans a and b?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?