During July, the Jamal Company incurred factory overhead a follows: utilities cost $6,500; accumulated depreciation, $2,500; and indirect salaries, $3,600. Which of the following is correct?
A. Factory Overhead, $12,600 Dr.; Utilities Payable, $6,500 Cr.; Accumulated Depreciation, $2,500 Cr.; Wages Payable, $3,600 Cr.
B. Utilities Expense, $6,500 Dr.; Depreciation Expense, $2,500 Dr.; Wages Expense, $3,600 Dr.; Accounts Payable, $12,600 Cr.
C. Accounts Payable, $12,600 Dr.; Utilities Expense, $6,500 Cr.; Depreciation Expense, $2,500 Cr.; Wages Payable, $3,600 Cr.
D. Work in process, $12,600 Dr.; Utilities Expense, $6,500 Cr.; Accumulated Depreciation, $2,500 Cr.; Wages Payable, $3,600 Cr.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?