Left you a trust that will pay you $26,000 per year for the next 21 years with the first payment received one year from today. If the appropriate interest rate is 5.9 percent, what is the value of the payments today?

Panera bread is a chain of cafes serving sandwiches, soups, and freshly baked breads. the company began in 1981 with stores primarily located along the east coast of the united states. since then, the firm has expanded to over 1,300 locations throughout the united states and canada. the firm has strong earnings and has been designated by business week as a "significant growth company." panera bread executives are considering the idea of expanding globally by opening cafes in asia through a franchising strategy. which of the following, if true, supports the argument that panera bread should expand into asia through franchising? a: the panera bread menu changes rapidly, and each cafe's artisan bread bakers receive regular training on new recipes. b: panera bread executives want fast access to the asian market without a significant investment of capital. c: panera bread executives want to test the asian market with a short-term commitment that allows them to make quick profits. d: the panera bread mission is to make excellent bread available to customers around the world.

Juanita and sam attend a beach party and notice that the local beach appears to have a great deal more trash washed up on shore than it did when they were young. the water doesn't appear nearly as clear, and there seems to be less evidence of small water creatures living in the shallows. an afternoon at the local library convinces them that one major cause is the new factory nearby. after some discussion, they decide their next step should be identifying the cause of the changes identifying the problem picketing the guilty factory lobbying their elected representatives to complain about the problem talking to a local environmental group about solutions

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?