The stadium manager has been tasked with maximizing total revenue (bound by current capacity, of course). What price should she set for tickets to maximize revenue?

When cell phones were first entering the market, they were relatively large and reception was undependable. all cell phones were essentially the same. but as the technology developed, many competitors entered, introducing features unique to their phones. today, cell phones are only a small fraction of the size and weight of their predecessors. consumers can buy cell phones with color screens, cameras, internet access, daily planners, or voice activation (and any combination of these features). the history of the cell phone demonstrates what marketing trend?

While cell phones with holographic keyboards are currently in the introduction stage of the industry life cycle, tablet computers are in the growth stage. in the context of this scenario, which of the following statements is true? a. the industry for cell phones with holographic keyboards will face greater competition than the tablet industry. b. while the industry for cell phones with holographic keyboards will focus more on product innovation, the tablet industry will focus more on process innovation. c. while the industry for cell phones with holographic keyboards can reap the benefits of economies of scale, the tablet industry will experience no such benefits. d. the industry for cell phones with holographic keyboards will face price competition, whereas, in the tablet industry, the mode of competition will be non-price.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?