The United Nation of Zorwaya has strict restrictions on direct investment by foreign enterprises, and it opposes the establishment and operation of private enterprises. The highest authority in the country enforces tight control over prices and production output. According to this information, the United Nation of Zorwaya most likely opposes.

Customers arrive at rich dunn's styling shop at a rate of 3 per hour, distributed in a poisson fashion. rich can perform an average of 5 haircuts per hour, according to a negative exponential distribution. a) the average number of customers waiting for haircuts= customersb) the average number of customers in the shop= customersc) the average time a customer waits until it is his or her turn= minutesd) the average time a customer spends in the shop= minutese) the percentage of time that rich is busy= percent

Wo firms, a and b, each currently dump 50 tons of chemicals into the local river. the government has decided to reduce the pollution and from now on will require a pollution permit for each ton of pollution dumped into the river. it costs firm a $100 for each ton of pollution that it eliminates before it reaches the river, and it costs firm b $50 for each ton of pollution that it eliminates before it reaches the river. the government gives each firm 20 pollution permits. government officials are not sure whether to allow the firms to buy or sell the pollution permits to each other. what is the total cost of reducing pollution if firms are not allowed to buy and sell pollution permits from each other? what is the total cost of reducing pollution if the firms are allowed to buy and sell permits from each other? a. $3,000; $1,500 b. $4,500; $3,500 c. $4,500; $4,000 d. $4,500; $2,500

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?