Ticasso co. issued 5,000 shares of its $1 par common stock, valued at $100,000, to acquire shares of eurat company in an all-stock transaction. ticasso paid the investment bankers $35,000 and will treat the investment banker fee asa) an expense for the current year. b) a prior period adjustment to retained earnings. c) additional goodwill on the consolidated balance sheet. d) a reduction to additional paid-in capital.

Match the vocabulary word to the correct definition. 1. compensation 2. corporate social responsibility 3. discrimination 4. benefits 5. biodegradable a. a business’s obligation to the community and the environment b. the ability to naturally break down or decompose c. treating someone differently because of his or her race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or disabilities d. indirect and non-cash compensation paid to employees e. the salary and other benefits for doing a job

Suppose farmer lane grows and sells cotton in a perfectly competitive industry. the market price of cotton is $1.64 per kilogram, and his marginal cost of production is $1.44 per kilogram, which increases with output. assume farmer lane is currently earning a profit. can farmer lane do anything to increase his profit in the short run? farmer lane: a. cannot do anything to increase his profit. b. may or may not be able to increase his profit. c. can increase his profit by raising his price. d. can increase his profit by producing more output. e. can increase his profit by shutting down.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?